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Abstract—Best practices for Internet of Things (IoT) secu-
rity have recently attracted considerable attention worldwide
from industry and governments, while academic research has
highlighted the failure of many IoT product manufacturers to
follow accepted practices. We explore not the failure to follow
best practices, but rather a surprising lack of understanding,
and void in the literature, on what (generically) “best prac-
tice” means, independent of meaningfully identifying specific
individual practices. Confusion is evident from guidelines that
conflate desired outcomes with security practices to achieve
those outcomes. How do best practices, good practices, and
standard practices differ? Or guidelines, recommendations, and
requirements? Can something be a best practice if it is not
actionable? We consider categories of best practices, and how they
apply over the lifecycle of IoT devices. For concreteness in our
discussion, we analyze and categorize a set of 1014 IoT security
best practices, recommendations, and guidelines from industrial,
government, and academic sources. As one example result, we
find that about 70% of these practices or guidelines relate to
early IoT device lifecycle stages, highlighting the critical position
of manufacturers in addressing the security issues in question.
We hope that our work provides a basis for the community to
build on in order to better understand best practices, identify
and reach consensus on specific practices, and then find ways to
motivate relevant stakeholders to follow them.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, IoT, Best Practices
I. INTRODUCTION
When we talk of “best practices”, we rely on each other’s
intuitive understanding of what a best practice is. Unfortu-
nately, closer inspection suggests that we lack both a good
understanding of this term, and an unambiguous explicit
definition. In this paper, we provide what we believe is the
first in-depth study towards understanding what is meant by
“security best practice”. While for concreteness herein our
main scope is security and privacy best practices for consumer-
focused Internet of Things (IoT), we believe that much of our
work may be of independent interest beyond IoT or security.
IoT is commonly described as adding network connectivity
to typically non-networked items or “things” [1]. It surrounds
us with a variety of network-connected devices such as
smart light bulbs, door locks, and less obvious objects like
fridges, toasters, traffic lights, or sensors and controllers built
into critical infrastructure systems. The importance of IoT
in marketing and sales has resulted in the production of a
wide variety of devices with arguably “unneccessary” func-
tionality (e.g., internet-connected toasters and stuffed animal
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toys). These devices, while perhaps convenient and highly
functional for users, have acquired a reputation [2] of poor
security and misconfiguration, leading to huge numbers of
network-accessible devices being vulnerable. As IoT devices
may be more isolated or resource-constrained (e.g., battery
power, processors, memory), or lacking in software update
support, their security issues are often hard to address. The
cyberphysical nature of IoT—interfacing to physical world
objects—results in threats to our physical world, as well as
to networks and other internet hosts [3]. This has resulted in
attention to identifying best practices for IoT security.
The concept of “best practices” appears rather nebulous
and informal. Academic work on this is scant and lacks
concrete definitions, relying instead on apparently reasonable
common sense. For example, in considering Cloud Security
Providers (CSPs), Huang et al. [4] refer to: “security mech-
anisms that have been implemented across a large portion of
the CSP industry [are thus] considered standardized into a
‘best-practice’.” Here best practice appears to mean widely
implemented. In their evaluation of home-based IoT devices,
Alrawi et al. [2] note numerous violations of security design
principles, and assert “Best practices and guidelines for the
IoT components are readily available”, but cite none among
108 references, and offer no definition. In a recent national
news article [5] on banks disclaiming liability for customer
losses from e-transfer fraud, and one-sided online banking
agreements, a defensive bank representative is quoted: “We
regularly review our policies and procedures to ensure they
align with best practices.” This quote appears to be not about
security best practices, but rather legal best practices in the
sense of our agreements are no worse than our competitors.
Large collections of documents from industrial, government,
and academic sources also suggest conflation of the term “best
practice” with other common terms such as “recommendation”
and “guideline” [6]. These examples collectively suggest con-
fusion, ambiguity, and misuse resulting from the lack of a
common understanding or precise definition of the term “best
practice”.
We first explore current use of terms related to best prac-
tices, and how their meanings differ qualitatively. We organize
these descriptive terms into three categories, giving a visual
model as aid. We distinguish and define (actionable) security
practices distinct from desired security outcomes, which we
further split into type-S (specific outcomes suggesting prac-
tices) and type-V (vague outcomes). To get a sense of the
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stakeholders potentially involved in best practices, and when,
we use a lifecycle model for IoT security devices. We use this,
and thirteen “Guidelines” from the UK’s Code of Practice for
Consumer IoT Security [7], as a basis for our own analysis of
over 1000 items from a companion UK government document
[6] which maps these items onto the thirteen guidelines.
The rich collection of over 1000 items is from industry
and government sources offering IoT security and privacy
best practices, best available methods, security guidelines,
requirements, recommendations, and standards. Our analysis
finds that for consumer IoT security, the majority of practices
relate to early phases of an IoT device’s lifecycle. As a result,
poor security posture developed early in the lifecycle accrues
what may be called a “security debt” (cf. tech debt—easy but
low quality technical choices made during development incur
later costs [8]). We also find that an overwhelming majority
of recommendations (91%) are not actual practices but rather
desired outcomes.
This suggests that many listed recommend practices are too
vague for the relevant stakeholders to implement successfully,
which then negatively impacts stakeholders at later stages
in a lifecycle. An observation that follows easily is that all
stakeholders seeking advice on best practices would benefit
if guideline lists were reworked to also suggest examples
of suitable practices (rather than desired outcomes), or if
lists of desired outcomes were supplemented by examples of
actionable practices known to reliably achieve the outcome.
II. CONFUSION ABOUT WHAT “BEST PRACTICE” MEANS
Here we offer a definition for “best practice”, and consider
the concepts of outcomes, actions, and “actionable” practices.
We also discuss related terms commonly appearing in liter-
ature. Through this, we aim for a more precise working vo-
cabulary in discussing best practices, and to disambiguate the
wide variety of qualifying terms into meaningful categories.
The definition of “best practice” seems to be taken some-
what for granted, as very few documents that use it make an
effort to define it. Of note, even RFC 1818/BCP 1 [9], the first
of the IETF RFCs specifying what a Best Current Practice
document is, fails to define “best practice”. This suggests
the term (and concept of) best practice is used casually,
versus scientifically—presumably everyone understands what
it means well enough to not require a specific definition.
This, however, leads to ambiguity, where certain uses of “best
practice” have different meanings and connotations, while
elsewhere different phrases may imply the same concept.
While focused more on human aspects of best practices,
of specific note is King’s discussion [10] of security best
practices, where it is defined as “practices that have proven
effective when used by one or more organizations and which,
therefore, promise to be effective if adapted by other organi-
zations”. King’s discussion of the definition covers a number
of important concepts, including that effectiveness is based on
evidence of multiple instances (i.e., a consensus), the practice
must be applicable to real situations, not theoretical; and that it
may exist among a set of practices of equal quality to perform
a security process [10].
In an effort to reduce ambiguity in terminology, we suggest
the following working definition: For a given desired outcome,
a “best practice” is a means intended to achieve that outcome,
and that is considered to be at least as “good” as the best of
other broadly-considered means to achieve that same outcome.
It is something that can be practiced (an action), not something
that is desired to be achieved (an outcome).
It appears infeasible to specify an objective best practice,
i.e., one that is best possible for all environments and appli-
cations and target users. A determination of an objective best
practice would require knowledge of not only every practice
and some way to measure their quality for comparison with
one another, but also a one-size-fits-all practice that addressed
all circumstances. In lieu of an objective best practice, we
consider a best practice to be born of a consensus (if reach-
able), e.g., of the experts in a given field. Some degree of
consensus or common use within a group may suffice for a
practice to considered a best practice if it is seen as better than
other means to achieve the same goal (from our definition). As
such, there may be different political pressures into designating
a practice as a best practice. A stakeholder in some practice
(e.g., manufacturer of a product to use in a practice) may try
to build consensus that their practice is the best for their own
gain (economic or otherwise).
Can there be more than one best practice for a desired
outcome? Our working definition suggests that a practice be
at least as good as others to achieve the same outcome. While
one view of “best” might imply being above all known others,
another is that “best” is a category that may have more than
one member. We argue that it is reasonable to allow (by
definition) that there are multiple best practices.
The description of a best practice often fails to indicate an
explicit desired outcome. We view this as a flaw; our working
definition presupposes a desired outcome, and we suggest that
a best practice for describing best practices is to explicitly
identify the desired outcome. This may not be essential to
implement the practice, but provides supporting information
for an implementer to understand the objectives of their efforts.
Best practices, if defined by the groups that use them,
can then differ across country or culture (and in some cases
perhaps also across environments, applications and budgets).
Even if we consider that an objective best practice exists if it
can be formally verified as achieving an outcome in a superior
way (often difficult given subjective metrics), groups unaware
of such a practice would maintain their own practices that are,
from their perspective, still the best.
We can also consider the concept of a best practice from
three angles: legal, technical, and social. From a legal per-
spective, following a best practice or standard may be used
as an argument to escape or limit liability, as in “following
the crowd” or consensus as surely being reasonable. An
example is financial institutions citing “industry best practices”
to disclaim liability, per our introduction [5]. Technically, a
best practice is the best way known to technical experts or
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researchers, for achieving an outcome (as agreed by some form
of consensus). Socially, “best practice” often implies the most
common (if not necessarily best) way to do something. At one
level, one might argue that each of these are similar, but at a
deeper level, their semantic meanings are quite different uses
of the same term.
A. Outcomes vs. Actions
An outcome is the end goal that a stakeholder desires to
reach. An action is the technical means by which to reach
an outcome. For example, an outcome may be to “store user
passwords securely”, and an action to achieve this outcome
may be “salt and hash user passwords using current NIST-
approved algorithms”. In practice, outcomes or goals that are
vague or broad may not give stakeholders a clear idea of any
concrete set of actions that would achieve the goal. A desired
outcome of “strong security”, for example, is nebulous, and
cannot be mapped to specific actions to achieve the goal.
It is folly to attempt to determine actions that achieve an
intangible goal. In contrast, defining tightly-scoped outcomes
or specifying an objective to withstand specific attacks, allows
for successful mapping to corresponding actions.
A best practice, by our working definition, must be action-
able in order to qualify as a practice. An outcome can not be
a best practice via this same definition, as it does not specify a
means to an end. Once an action is defined, the practice may be
viewed as actionable, meaning that it can be acted upon by an
implementer. We define an “actionable” practice as a practice
that involves a known sequence of steps, and it is known how
to do them. An “implementer” is a stakeholder (manufacturer,
user, or otherwise) who would be responsible for or be in the
best position to implement a practice. Implementers should be
able to understand what is required to carry out a practice.
This means wording and outcomes must be understood from
both a (semantic) language perspective and, importantly, a
technical perspective, and the practices should involve only
available existing techniques. Requiring techniques that are
experimental or unproven introduces ambiguity in how to carry
out a practice and results in inconsistent implementations.
Some outcomes more clearly suggest actions than others
(e.g., “no default passwords” vs. “validate input data” [7]).
For this reason we categorize outcomes into two broad types:
• Type-V outcome (Vague)—the outcome does not strongly
imply actions to take to achieve it
• Type-S outcome (Specific)—the outcome implies specific
actions to take to achieve it
Type-S outcomes tend to involve a specific goal, whereas
type-V outcomes tend to involve broad or vague goals. Type-
S outcomes are more useful in practice, with less room for
(mis)interpretation of what is required to achieve the outcome.
Upon deeper inspection, a number of sub-categories would
emerge. This depth is not further explored herein.
It follows that a recommendation specifying an outcome,
but the path to which is an open research problem, cannot
(and should not) be considered an actionable practice. It is
important for the security (in our case) community—whether
by academic, industrial, or government efforts—to identify and
agree on actionable practices with concrete desired outcomes
for implementers. These can be adopted or standardized across
applications and implementations, thereby simplifying imple-
mentation and establishing confidence in the authorities that
recommend and endorse best practices.
We separate the two concepts of a practice being actionable,
and an implementer having the means by which to put said
practice into place. Implementers must have the resources
(technical, financial, personnel) available before a practice
can be implemented, but availability of resources (or lack
thereof) does not affect the generic actionability of a practice.
(Note: though a practice is actionable in general, that does
not guarantee that a given party themself has the resources to
adopt the practice.) A practice that has a significant cost may
be ruled out as a best practice by a recommending group,
governing body, or peer community.
B. Commonly-Used Qualifying Terms
A number of “qualifying terms” describing the quality of
some practice (e.g., “common”, “good”, “best”) are often
used without definition or seemingly interchangeably within
literature. This lack of clarity calls for a careful examination
of their meaning and usage. Being widely used in litera-
ture might suggest that readers know (and are in universal
agreement on) what authors mean when they use one of
these terms, but this appears false—and the root cause is,
we suggest, the absence of explicit definitions. In an effort
to both highlight existing, and reduce ongoing ambiguity, we
categorize a number of commonly-used qualifying terms into
classes and suggest where/when each term should be used. To
this end, Table I outlines commonly-used qualifying terms,
their associated usage categories, and a brief description of
their usage. This classification describes each term and what
categories of practices are associated with them. Regardless
of category that a qualifying term may fall into, there remains
the requirement that any (true) “practice” as defined by these
terms should be actionable, for reasons as discussed earlier.
C. Practice Quality
Quality-based terms provide a natural basis on which to dif-
ferentiate practices, e.g., “good” or “best”. Here we delineate
three categories ranging from the highest possible quality of
a practice, to those that still improve security posture but are
not widely considered the best.
“U¨ber Practices”: The term “U¨ber Practices” suggests
practices in some way superior to (other) “best” practices,
or somehow beyond what would be considered already high
quality. Similarly, “state-of-the-art” implies something at an
absolute peak of technical quality, but perhaps not yet widely
adopted. Consider as a practical example: in luxury cars, a
heated steering wheel. While more comfortable on a winter
day, best practice would likely be to ensure correct function
and adequate steering grip to reduce likelihood of accidents.
A heating function is “above and beyond” that.
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TABLE I
A CLASSIFICATION OF COMMONLY-USED GENERAL QUALIFYING TERMS FOR PRACTICES AND THEIR SUGGESTED USAGE IN LITERATURE.
Category Terms Suggested Usage
U¨ber Practices “above-and-beyond” For practices that provide superior outcomes, though not widely adopted. These terms tend to imply
top-tier quality, albeit sometimes at very high cost or complexity.“gold standard”
“state-of-the-art”
Best Practices “best practice” Used when describing the practices widely-considered to be the highest level of quality. These are
widely-considered (plus commonly adopted, typically) whereas for above-and-beyond, wide
consideration or broad use is not a requirement.
“best current practice”
Good Practices “good practice” For practices that are beneficial to implement and improve quality (versus not implementing it),
without implying that better practices do not exist.“suggested practice”
“recommended practice”
“acceptable practice”
Common Practices “common practice” For practices that do not necessarily imply the quality of an associated practice, but instead suggest
wide use.“standard practice”
“accepted practice”
Requirements “requirement” For practices that are, in some way, enforced by an entity such that there implies a negative
consequence should the practice not be followed. Alternatively, these may be de facto practices or
functionality, informally recognized by experts as essential.
“minimum requirement”
“mandatory practice”
“baseline practice”
“code of practice”
“regulation”
Formal Recognition “formal standard” For practices that are endorsed in some official capacity by an organization or individual.
“recommendation”
“guideline”
“guidance”
“Best Practices”: “Best practice” terms describe prac-
tices widely considered to be both the best available and
relatively widely adopted. A key point is wide consideration
among a group as being a best practice. While practices may
exist that are technically better (U¨ber practices), best practices
are widely accepted to be high in quality.
“Good Practices”: “Good practices” improve the secu-
rity posture, but are not necessarily the best security practices
available. They generally are not lauded for high quality per se.
A “good” practice often either does not have wide acceptance
as being the best, or is perhaps not widely practiced or not
considered essential despite being easy and beneficial (e.g.,
turning the wheels to the curb when parking on a hill). Further
consideration for context may prove useful for understanding
good-practice usage. For example, securing a low-value free
online newspaper account may not require a best practice (as
per the above definition), but a good practice that adequately
fulfils its task. In other words, [10]: “sometimes the good is
good enough”.
Conceptually, we categorize “good”, “best”, and “u¨ber”
along one continuum or dimension of quality, ranging from
lower to higher.
We note that terms used to describe practices of low
quality (i.e., below good) receive less attention in literature as
documents promoting security advice focus more on good than
bad practices. Our definition of a good practice (the lowest
quality we formally categorize) implies that anything lower
does not improve security posture.
D. Common Practices and Requirements.
Common practices and requirements share with quality
terms (above) their trait of having “practice” commonly within
their terms (e.g., “accepted practice”, “mandatory practice”).
However, in contrast, they suggest frequency or obligation of
use.
Common Practices: “Common practice” qualifying terms
do not imply any quality of associated practices, but rather
reflect broad usage. For example, it may (unfortunately) be
common to store passwords in plaintext within a database (thus
being a common practice), but that is not best practice (or even
a good practice).
Requirements: A requirement differs from quality-based
terms (u¨ber, best, good) as it does not necessarily imply the
quality of a given practice, but rather that it is mandated by
some governing body or general expectation. They may be
considered “enough” for some purposes (e.g., “enough to not
be sued” or “enough to pass inspection/regulation”). Practices
across a range of qualities may be requirements depending on
the implied governing body or motivation. Requirements tend
to sit somewhere between common practices and formal recog-
nition. On one hand, their terminology may contain “practice”
(e.g., mandatory practice, baseline practice) without implying
a measure of quality, but on the other hand, they are required
by some governing body, suggesting formal recognition.
Because the “requirements” and “common practice” cate-
gories do not necessarily define quality, we assign them to an
orthogonal “commonality” dimension, with common practice
below requirement. Correlated to commonality is the maturity
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of a practice. A practice that has proven to be of a high
quality is more likely to become a requirement or part of a
standard. A requirement is often just a binary “yes” or “no”,
but may also be non-binary, e.g., as an ordering within a large
set of related requirements. Practices may be requirements or
common practices, and a common practice or requirement may
be a good, best, or u¨ber practice. Ideally, a best practice will
become a common practice, and both become required, and
endorsed (below).
E. Formal Recognition (Endorsement)
While the above discusses quality, commonality, and ma-
turity, other terms that arise surrounding best practices have
more to do with informal or formal endorsements of a practice.
This may trigger greater adoption (and is often the goal of an
endorsement).
Formal Standard: We use “formal standard” to mean a
formalized (i.e., documented, agreed-on by some formal body)
set of requirements. This implies not necessarily quality, but
an established set of practices formalized for adoption by some
group or governing body. The purpose of a standard may
be interoperability, rather than quality per se—e.g., standards
for the width of rail tracks, or widths of screws or pipes.
In this context, “Formal Standard” differs from “standard
practice” (i.e., common practice), which falls within the earlier
discussion related to frequently practiced, e.g., it is standard
to eat at 12noon. Standards are typically sufficiently detailed
such that conformance or compliance is easily judged by, e.g.,
an auditor, or interoperability tests.
Recommendation: A “recommendation” is an endorse-
ment of, e.g., a practice by an entity (individual or orga-
nization) as their suggested way to do something. Recom-
mendations (depending on the recommending entity) may be
subject to bias, and do not necessarily reflect expertise or
universal consensus. For example, a government may recom-
mend washing your hands with soap under warm water for
20 seconds [11]—this may or may not be a best practice,
but it is recommended by an organization. Recommendations
are often less strict than requirements, and typically not as
well documented as formal standards, but these fall along a
common dimension also. Some recommendations, by virtue
of the body they arise from, are understood to be, in essence,
requirements. Recommendations commonly suggest following
a standard [6]. Just as we suggest that a best practice have an
explicitly stated goal, a recommendation should, in our view,
ideally be accompanied by an explanation of the intended
outcome, to help implementers understand the motivation.
Guidance/Guideline: A guideline or guidance is often
given by an entity to promote a suggested way to achieve a
goal. This may be used as a synonym for a recommendation
(above), positioned as guiding towards to a goal—or perhaps
offered as help, versus imposing rules. We typically guide
someone to something, suggesting a target, goal or desired
outcome, ideally are explicitly stated if not obvious.
The “formal recognition” category notes qualifying terms
that describe endorsed practices. These too can be ordered
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Fig. 1. A model that categorically distinguishes practice-related characteris-
tics.
along a continuum, with a formal standard being on the upper
end, most highly endorsed item; to guidance, which may
logically be considered as the lowest form of endorsement.
Much like requirements and common practices, formal recog-
nition/endorsements do not necessarily imply quality; however,
the endorsing organization may have a recognized governing
or expert status. This continuum related to endorsement can
be placed on a third axis.
F. Conceptual Model of Terms
From this, we envision a 3-D graph with axes of quality
(good, best, u¨ber), frequency of use or commonality (common
practice below requirement), and the level of endorsement a
practice has received (formal standardization, recommenda-
tion, guideline). See Figure 1. The three-axis model provides
a mental image of how one piece of advice compares to
another within three-dimensional space. This visualization
helps us conceptualize more easily than simply comparing
two pieces of advice based on their wording, and may suggest
relationships between items placed within this space.
III. LIFECYCLE OF IOT DEVICES
In this section, we present a simplified model of the
lifecycle of an IoT device. We discuss the major and minor
stages a device moves through during its life. This allows
an understanding of the relationship between an IoT device
manufacturer and the end-users that will be impacted by the
manufacturer’s security-related design choices. This will aid
later analysis of the roles these and other stakeholders play in
security.
The lifecycle of an IoT device includes all major phases a
device could go through from its early design up to the time it
is discarded (disposed-of, or otherwise never used again) [12].
This plays a significant role in the discussion surrounding best
practices, particularly for IoT devices, as their nature is to be
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Fig. 2. A typical lifecycle for an IoT device, from initial design to end-of-life.
long-lasting, fairly idle, and more commonly link our digital
environments to our physical environments. Decisions made
within one part of the lifecycle may affect later phases. Once
these products have left the hands of manufacturers, it becomes
more challenging to properly address vulnerabilities due to the
more highly resource-constrained nature of IoT products. It is
important that we understand what processes take place within
each major phase. Figure 2 presents the typical lifecycle of an
IoT device and the major phases a device is expected to go
through. These phases are discussed here.
1) Creation
The Creation phase consists of four sub-phases that all
take place at the purview of the manufacturer. This is where
a product is designed, developed, and otherwise readied for
consumption by a user. The key feature that separates the
Creation phase from all other phases is that it takes place
before the end-user is involved. Sub-phases may be done
with the end-users in mind, but the product has not yet been
received by them.
1.1) Design: The Design phase is where the design of
both the hardware and software of an IoT device is done. This
includes design considerations for security such as choice of
software toolkits or libraries, selecting operating systems, or
design of software that will run on a device. This phase con-
cludes when the designs have been formalized and ready for
manufacturing of the product. This includes the design of any
hardware and software (OS, IoT app) if these components are
not sourced from entities outside of the manufacturer. It should
be noted that designs may change over time and potentially
require updates for future models, so the design phase may
be mentally considered to be more cyclical; however, in our
vision of the lifecycle, we consider a singular model/version
of a device.
1.2a) Hardware Manufacture: The Hardware Manufac-
ture phase is where the physical device is produced by
the IoT device manufacturer (if done in-house) or dedicated
hardware manufacturer. While this phase primarily concerns
the development of hardware, as firmware (“software that is
embedded in a hardware device” [13]) is so closely tied to
hardware, firmware is developed in this phase. This phase
concludes when a device is physically complete and ready
to have its software loaded and preconfigured.
1.2b) OS/App Development: The OS/App Development
phase takes place in a conceptual parallel to the Hardware
Manufacture phase. This is where any operating system or
core-functionality software is built. The OS may be developed
by the product manufacturer, or at another time by an external
organization (e.g., a Linux distribution is likely not developed
by an IoT manufacturer, but may be used by them). The
core-functionality software is the software that is required to
provide a device with the ability to undertake its standard
function, e.g., the software that will control the camera in an
IP camera, or control temperature in a thermostat. This phase
concludes when the OS and software are ready to be integrated
with the hardware.
1.3) Product Integration & Preconfiguration: The Prod-
uct Integration & Preconfiguration phase is where software
is loaded onto an IoT device’s hardware and configured with
any settings or data that will be required for basic functionality
and/or security process. This included the application of an OS
or any software to hardware, core functionality applications
onto an OS, provisioning of cryptographic material (e.g., key
pairs, long-term keys, certificates, trust-anchors), or anything
else that must be configured before being used by the end-
user. In the case of a device with very basic functionality
such as a microcontroller with minimal functionality and no
non-firmware software to run, this step may not be required.
This phase concludes when the device is in a ready-to-ship
state (i.e., ready to be sent to a retailer or customer). There
may exist an additional packaging phase after this where the
product is put into its retail packaging, but having no technical
implications, we do not consider this within our model.
2) Installation
The Installation phase consists of two sub-phases where
the user has received the product, but has not yet readied it
for standard usage. These two sub-phases consist of what is
commonly referred to as “onboarding” or “bootstrapping” (of-
ten used interchangeably or meaning slightly different things,
depending on who uses it) [14] where a number important
technical details such as key management, identification, and
6
trust relationships are established; and more general user-
focused configuration.
2.1) Installation: The Installation sub-phase is when a
user installs the device in its environment. Examples of this
may be the placement of the device with connection to a
power source or have a battery installed/activated (if not
already active), connecting to physical network, and powering
the device on. While physical connection to a network (i.e.,
inserting network cable) is considered in the installation phase,
any networking configuration to do with the physical network
connection or wireless connection takes place in the Config-
uration phase. This phase’s sole purpose is to place a device
into an environment and prepare it for user configuration and
concludes when this has been done.
2.2) Configuration: The Configuration phase is where a
user provides any configuration to the device that they need in
order to set the device into its standard usage state, and provide
any security configuration for standard usage. This stage
includes processes such as network configuration (particularly
in the case of wireless communication, as the wired connection
is done in the previous phase and commonly automatically
configured by various networking protocols), the setting or
resetting of passwords for device access, the generation of
new keying material and onboarding (if not pre-generated by
the manufacturer or requiring new key relationships), or setting
any functional/behavioral settings that the user may want from
their device. More drastically, this phase may also include
performing a factory reset of the device, requiring that users
fully reconfigure their device. This phase concludes when the
device has been configured to the end-user’s liking and any
onboarding/bootstrapping functions have been completed.
3) Usage
3.1a) Standard Usage: The Standard Usage phase is
where the device is functioning as intended (e.g., a light bulb
provides light, a smart thermostat controls temperature, a home
security camera provides live camera access to users). This
phase concludes when a software/firmware update is available
for the device (and the user chooses to update), when the user
wishes to make configuration changes to the device (moving
back to the Configuration phase), or when the user wishes to
discontinue the device’s usage. While seemingly small within
our model, this is the phase where the device is expected to
spend the majority of its life.
3.1b) Software/Firmware Update: The Soft-
ware/Firmware Update phase is where the device receives and
installs new software. This phase concludes when a device
has successfully updated, or fails to update. In the case of a
successful update, reconfiguration may be required for any
settings that may have been reset, or for new functionality
to be configured. In the case of an update failure, the device
may fall back to its standard usage or cease to function and
require disposal.
4) Decommissioning
4.1) Data/Key Removal: The Data/Key Removal phase
is where sensitive data is removed from a device prior to
being removed from an environment. If private user data
is not removed, future users or attackers may be able to
recover data. Keying material is removed to prevent session
keys, network connection information, or other sensitive data
from being leaked upon future inspection. This may also
include the removal of data stored by manufacturers or service
providers in other devices or in cloud servers. This phase
may also be referred to as “offboarding”, where many of the
tasks completed during onboarding are undone. This phase
concludes once all specified data has been removed, or if a
user chooses to skip the removal.
4.2a) Disposal: The Disposal phase is the final phase of
a device’s lifecycle if ownership is not transferred. The device
is uninstalled and discarded in some way, whether it is through
simple garbage disposal or recycling of the device’s parts.
4.2b) Transfer Ownership: The Transfer Ownership is
the terminating phase in a single owner’s IoT device lifecycle,
where a device’s ownership is transferred (whether sold or
gifted) to another end-user or organization. The device is
uninstalled from the environment. Upon receiving the new
device, the new owner will have to return to the Installation
phase in the device’s lifecycle to begin as the original owner
did, or if configuration still exists, the new owner may be able
to immediately begin usage.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CATEGORIZATION OF PRACTICES
In this section we discuss a large collection of industry,
academic, and government security advice. We categorize the
items in this collection based on when they are implemented
on the IoT lifecycle (Figure 2), and whether or not each
item aligns with our definition of a “best practice”, versus
an outcome (type-V or type-S). Noting where practices are
implemented throughout the IoT lifecycle allows us to see
which stakeholders have the greatest impact on overall device
security. Matching our definition of “best practice” with each
item allows us to get a general sense of how well existing
advice lists and literature have provided actionable practices.
The UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport
(DCMS) has published a collection of IoT security recommen-
dations, standards, and guidelines [6]. These were extracted
from academic, industry, and government documents for man-
ufacturers of IoT products [6], and includes 1014 practices
(after explicit duplicates were removed) collected from 69
documents, from 49 different organizations. They categorize
each practice into one of 13 “outcome focused guidelines” [7]
(also in the process of being adopted by the government of
Australia [15]). A few examples of their guidelines includes
“no default passwords”, “communicate securely”, and “make it
easy for customers to delete personal data”. Table III provides
a full listing of the 13 guidelines.
We note that the UK document is entitled “Code of Practice
for Consumer IoT Security” [7]. We consider a code of prac-
tice as a regulation (e.g., residential/commercial building code,
electrical code, fire code, etc.), resulting in our classification
as a requirement in Table I; however, their document outlines
“outcome focused guidelines”. We classify guidelines under
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4. Decommissioning
3. Usage
2. Installation
1. Creation 706 (69.6%)(488, 138, 80)
67 (6.6%)
(39, 21, 7)
260 (25.6%)
(232, 24, 4)
27 (2.7%)
(25, 2, 0)
Type-V Outcome
Type-S Outcome
Practice
Fig. 3. Distribution of the listed 1014 items (guidelines, recommendations,
best practices) across IoT major lifecycle phases. Total percentage exceeds 100
as some practices appear in multiple phases. (X, Y, Z) denotes the respective
number of practices for (type-V outcomes, type-S outcomes, practices). Bars
of small numbers have had their widths slightly exaggerated to improve
readability.
the formal recognition category. As discussed in Section II,
we place requirements and formal recognition on their own
continuum (endorsement).
While this is a significant collection of industry work and
it does specifically target stakeholders that would implement
practices, their categorization does not focus on the lifecycle
of IoT products. This is an important consideration when
discussing IoT as, given the long-lasting and ubiquitous nature
of the devices, significant numbers of practices must be
implemented for different stages of a product’s life (Figure 2).
Different stakeholders will be affected depending on the
practice and when it is implemented, often putting distance
between the potential lack of practice implementation and the
impact of such a decision. Further, upon inspection of DCMS
collected best practices, we found the majority of practices
can belong to multiple lifecycle stages. Considerations for
lifecycle stage and stakeholder impact expands on the DCMS’
categorization [7].
Regarding methodology, we manually categorized each ad-
vice item (1014 items) in two ways: where in the lifecycle each
item would be best implemented from a security perspective,
and if an item was an outcome or a practice. For the first lifecy-
cle tagging, each item was associated with which phase in the
IoT lifecycle they belong to. This was done by examining each
item and determining which stakeholder would be the most
appropriate to implement it, and matching where their work
was done to the lifecycle. For the second categorization, each
item was manually tagged as being a type-V outcome, type-S
outcome, or practice. If an item met our working definition of
a practice, it was tagged as a “practice”. If it was not a practice,
the level of specificity/vagueness was judged: items that were
highly vague were tagged as a type-V outcome, items that
were more specific and implying actions were tagged as type-
S outcomes. There were a number of items in the collection
that were not goals to be reached, but often just descriptions
of techniques and technologies. In these cases, it was assumed
that they are meant to be targets to achieve, and we tagged
these as type-V outcomes.
Figure 3 highlights our results categorizing each major
phase in the IoT lifecycle (Figure 2) and the number of prac-
tices from the DCMS collection that would be implemented in
each. The practice distribution among phases paints an impor-
tant picture for the general implementation of best practices:
the overwhelming majority (about 69.6%) of practices relate to
stages before leaving the manufacturer’s hands (the Creation
phase), indicating that it is the designers and manufacturers
of a product that are the parties in a position to implement
them. This is a rather apparent conclusion to draw from these
results, but it quantifies the significance and importance of the
security posture developed during this stage.
Figure 3 also highlights our second categorization of
whether or not an item is an outcome or a practice. We find
that 784 of the 1014 recommendations (77.3%) are vague
and not practices at all (type-V outcomes), 185 of the 1014
(18.2%) specify outcomes that are somewhat more specific
and imply actions, do not suggest actual practices (type-S
outcomes); and only 91 of the 1014 (9%) are actual practices
per our working definition. This second categorization shows
that organizations—often highly credible ones—are producing
recommendations for manufacturers that are not, in our view,
actionable, thus appear unlikely to be properly implemented.
This may require a significant shift in how we produce best
practices if manufacturers are expected to follow recommen-
dations.
We divide the stakeholders of IoT security into two groups:
“pre-sale” stakeholders that are involved during the Creation
phase prior to being sold, and “post-sale” stakeholders that
are affected by the decisions of “pre-sale” stakeholders. Note
that this “sale” describes when an end-user purchases the
product from a retailer, not when a user purchases the product
from another end-user or some other pre-owned method. The
decisions made in this phase have a direct impact on post-sale
stakeholders (e.g., users, platform providers, app developers,
OS developers) as weakness in product security posture may
have significant consequences later in the lifecycle.
V. PRIMARY IOT SECURITY STAKEHOLDERS
In this section we consider the major stakeholders involved
in the consumer IoT lifecycle. We discuss the roles and
responsibilities of stakeholders, and the impact they have on
the IoT lifecycle and security posture of devices produced by
manufacturers. Understanding each stakeholder’s impact for
the various components and features of a device allow us to
more clearly see how there are many moving parts that impact
a security posture.
For any given product there are numerous stakeholders. De-
pending on the product, some stakeholders are more impacted
by security issues than others. Each stakeholder has a number
of goals that dictate their actions with regards to their role
within the IoT lifecycle and how they are affected by the
implementation of best practices, and consequences that will
affect them if the practices are not implemented. It is important
to note the major stakeholders as each pre-sale stakeholder
may be responsible for implementing different practices based
on their role in the production of a device. These stakeholders
are discussed here, and Table II lists these stakeholders for
reference.
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TABLE II
STAKEHOLDERS IMPACTING THE LIFECYCLE OF AN IOT DEVICE.
HEREIN, OUR FOCUS IS PRIMARY STAKEHOLDERS.
Pre-sale Post-sale
Primary Stakeholders
HM: IoT hardware provider X
OD: IoT OS provider X X
AD: IoT software/app developer X X
PI: IoT product integrator X
DM: IoT device manufacturer X
EU: End-user X
Secondary/Other Stakeholders
Smartphone (OS, app) developers X
Smartphone app store host X
Third-party cloud platform X
Third-party cloud host X
Third-party cloud app developer X
Government regulators X
Standards and protocol designers X
A. Pre-Sale Stakeholders
IoT Hardware Provider: The hardware provider specifi-
cally manufacturers the hardware used in an IoT device. On
the high, less constrained end of hardware, an example is
the Raspberry Pi 4 [16] or Arduino Due [17]. On the low,
more highly-constrained end of hardware, it is becoming more
difficult to find pre-built (containing a processor of some sort,
memory, I/O) boards that fall within RFC 7228’s definition of
a highly-constrained (Class 0) device [18].
IoT OS Provider: The IoT OS provider stakeholder is
responsible for developing the OS for an IoT device. For the
most part, this only applies to devices that are capable of
running some form of OS rather than the highly constrained
devices that run only the most basic firmware and application-
specific software; however, a wide variety of hardware exists
[19]. Examples in this space include such OSs as RIOT [20],
Contiki [21] [22], or FreeRTOS [23]. The IoT OS provider
writes only the OS and surrounding functionality. The OS
would be applied to hardware, and any IoT apps would be
installed into the OS for application-specific functionality.
IoT Software/App Developer: IoT software/app develop-
ers are those that develop the core software that an IoT device
will run. This development is intended to run as software
on top of an IoT OS, or as the near-metal firmware running
on devices without OSs. As a fairly broad example, an “IoT
software/app” might be the software that collects, analyses,
and reports temperature readings on a smart thermometer
device, not the underlying software that provides the basic OS
functions and communication. Quite often these are developed
by the manufacturer (or contracted by the manufacturer), as
they are required to be very application-specific.
IoT Product Integrator: The product integrator is the
entity that receives hardware from the hardware manufacturer
and software from the software developer (IoT OS, apps), and
integrates them into the final product. This may include in-
stalling IoT apps onto an OS, then loading the resulting image
onto the hardware. The product integrator may be responsible
for preconfiguring a device (i.e., setting base configuration or
loading crypto materials such as keys, certificates, etc.), or they
may send the devices back to the manufacturer for this process.
Product integrators combine any hardware and software to
complete the basic IoT product that a manufacturer will later
sell. They are not necessarily interested in the implementation
of security features and best practices; however, their role may
be to apply certain pieces of information or installing features
that assist with this.
IoT Device Manufacturer: The IoT device manufacturers
design the product, manufacturer it, and ship it to users or
retailers for distribution to users. They may be responsible
for the development of software or hardware, but this is com-
monly done by another, contractually-obligated stakeholder. In
some cases, the device manufacturer may be responsible for
integrating any software components with hardware (acting as
the product integrator), or specific portions of the full pro-
cess (design, hardware manufacturing, software development,
warehousing, shipping).
B. Post-sale Stakeholders
Post-sale stakeholders are those that are primarily concerned
with an IoT after being purchased by a user (and including the
users). These stakeholders have little impact on the decisions
made pre-sale during the Creation phase. This makes them far
more impacted by security vulnerabilities caused by the lack
of best-practice implementation before the sale was made. For
this work, we focus primarily on the end-user, as they are the
ones purchasing devices, using services, and being the most
directly impacted by upstream problems.
End-users: The end-users are the individuals or orga-
nizations that purchase IoT products to install in their homes
or businesses. End-users—especially for more consumer-grade
products and/or services—are directly impacted by any func-
tionality changes; or indirectly via back-end decisions that may
affect their usage of the product/service. End-users essentially
have only one goal: use the product they purchased for its
intended function, for the time that they want to use it for.
This means they must be able to successfully move through
all post-Creation lifecycle phases. Disruption events such as
service down-time, malfunction, malicious attacks that hinder
their ability to use the device, or some other event that the
user deems out of their control will be a problem for them.
For the users, the greatest consequence of manufacturers not
implementing best practices is the potential vulnerabilities that
may exist in their device. The greatest influence the end-users
have on the manufacturers is with their wallets. In theory,
if enough end-users refused to purchase a manufacturer’s
products or services, sales would be lower and manufacturers
may find themselves adjusting to fit the needs of the end-users.
Besides their purchasing power, end-users have little influence
on manufacturers. End-users also have influence over a number
of other primary and secondary stakeholders. Their usage of
a product directly affects the usage of related products and/or
features such as the platforms and services provided (third-
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party platform providers), operating systems (OS developers),
or software running on or around a device (app developers).
C. Secondary/Other Stakeholders
Beyond the primary pre- and post-sale stakeholders, there
are a number of other groups that are impacted. While not be-
ing the subject of focus here as a “primary” stakeholder, these
are the stakeholders that are likely to be affected by the major
stakeholders and decisions made pre-sale. As it highlights the
breadth of potential impact for security best practices, we make
note of some secondary/other stakeholders in Table II, but this
is not an exhaustive list. The number of secondary stakeholders
highlights further impact that vulnerabilities and problems may
have on other post-sale stakeholders other than end-users.
VI. MOTIVATING BETTER SECURITY POSTURE
In this section we discuss possible methods to motivate
pre-sale stakeholders to adopt best practices to improve the
security posture for their devices. Understanding how chal-
lenging it may be to motivate pre-sale stakeholders to adopt
this better security posture highlights the importance of any
means to reduce adoption resistance including providing clear,
actionable best practices.
While some methods exist for post-sale stakeholders to
provide additional security for their devices, ensuring stronger
security practice implementation requires significant coopera-
tion with the pre-sale stakeholders. Expecting the IoT industry
to self-regulate has not worked so far, and with the scale that
IoT is expected to approach, strategies need to be put into place
as soon as possible rather than relying on the self regulation
to take place when the stakes have increased.
Manufacturers are not well-incentivized to implement the
established best practices. No incentive for implementation
may result in no implementation, as a cost-benefit analysis
may reveal an implementation is not worth the cost. This
issue may be exacerbated by the scale of a company looking
to produce IoT devices; smaller companies may not be able
to introduce practices that require more significant resource
investment. Further exacerbating this issue is the aspect of how
reasonable a practice is to be implemented, which ties directly
into the cost-benefit analysis. Different practices may be more
reasonable for some stakeholders to implement than others
(e.g., large manufacturers may have the means—although
not necessarily the motivation—to implement more costly
practices).
Perhaps the most natural approach is to rely upon end-
users to police poorly secured devices via the “vote with
your wallet” motto. In a perfect world, poorly secured devices
would not be purchased, but this does not work in reality for
a number of reasons:
• Awareness of issues—The end-users must be informed of
the security issues that plague a product, but this is often
difficult to find. The average user would not be search-
ing academic or industry research citing weaknesses of
certain products or features, and are less likely to stay up-
to-date on security- or tech-related websites and blogs.
• End-user resolve—The end-users must maintain their
resolve to not buy products if their security in inadequate.
This requires high levels of end-user education about ex-
isting problems with devices (see previous point). When
so many products have high usability, users may opt for
the functionality of the device (very visible and tangible
to the user) over the security, which tends to be more
invisible to them. Users will be drawn to the products
that work as they want them to work, following the “it
just works” mantra. Alternatively, if a product is widely
purchased, consumers may feel pressured to purchase it
based on social pressure, and ignore security issues.
Another approach is to continue with the current mechanism
for change via academic/industrial publications about vulner-
abilities. This provides visibility for the larger vulnerabilities
(e.g., “IoT Goes Nuclear” [24], Mirai botnet [25]), but the
smaller issues that should still be addressed may not provide
enough pressure on the manufacturer.
When we say we want to provide “incentive”, we really
mean that we are looking to add pressure to manufacturers.
Being incentivized implies a positive reason to change, while
being pressured has a negative connotation. As a business
will act in its best interest (the cost-benefit analysis problems
from above), more concrete and perhaps drastic methods are
required. One method already in limited use is government
regulation. While fraught with concern for overreach, lengthy
enactment periods, and inadequacy, government regulation
has the ability to enforce certain practices within a region.
Examples of this being done include the Government of
California (USA), which has passed a bill requiring IoT device
manufacturers to provide “reasonable security features” [26];
and the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), which provides guidelines and regulation for Euro-
pean service providers regarding user data usage [27].
While using governments to strictly enact and enforce
regulation on companies is likely to have a more concrete
impact on manufacturers, it has a number of drawbacks that
need to be taken into account:
• Government overreach: Asking a government to interfere
in an industry’s actions may seem rather heavy-handed,
and to many, an overreach of government power where
the government should not be interfering in the work-
ings of an industry. This view changes from country
to country where some view the role of government as
more important than others. For certain industries such as
healthcare, it may be more understandable to some to be
highly regulated by governments, as healthcare outcomes
are directly responsible for the physical well-being of its
citizens. Tech industries are not (yet) so directly tied to
the well-being of the citizens of a country, and issues
within the industry have historically not been critical
to the safety of a country’s populace. This is, however,
changing as IoT products become more intertwined with
our daily life, with some even being responsible for our
health. As this happens, government regulation may seem
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like more of a logical necessity, as healthcare is seen in
many countries.
• Government vs. Industry/Academic Disagreement: There
may exist the problem where those writing regulation
disagree with industry or academic researchers (or vice-
versa) about what practices should be enforced. This may
lead to inadequate practices being forced on manufactur-
ers and adopted due to political pressure versus sound
technical reasoning and consensus.
This said, government regulation has a number of benefits
that should be considered:
• Localized implementation—Attempting to have regula-
tion enacted across borders is challenging; however, reg-
ulation within a single government may be much more
approachable as a starting point and allowing more global
momentum to build.
• Change for one, change for all—A manufacturer that has
to produce two versions of the same product (one for one
government market, another for the rest of the world)
may opt to simply roll all improved security versions
into the same product and supply it to the rest of their
markets. This way, stakeholders from markets unaffected
by government regulation may reap the benefits of the
additional security without having to go through the
process of regulation.
Legislative bodies of significant world markets have a
greater ability to make government regulation be effective and
enforce change as the manufacturer will likely not want to
abandon such a large market to sell in. Smaller bodies do not
have this opportunity. Alternatively, governments and large
organization can enact change via their purchasing power.
These entities that purchase products for wide internal use
can put restrictions on their orders where the product will
only be purchased if it conforms with specific requirements.
For example, if a smart light bulb was planned to be used
across all government buildings within a country, stating that
they will not purchase the product if it is vulnerable to attack
X, Y, or Z may be enough to motivate manufacturers to fix the
related vulnerabilities. Much like the above, this only works
for entities with great buying power.
Despite the above drawbacks, government regulation ap-
pears to be the most effective—while quite heavy-handed—
way to most strictly enforce change within a region, as it
threatens manufacturers’ abilities to sell within a market,
which the other avenues have a more difficult time achieving.
With this said, not all practices can be (or necessarily should
be) candidates for government regulation. This concept is
discussed further in the next section.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION OF BEST PRACTICES
In this section, we map the UK’s 13 guidelines (for improv-
ing the security of IoT products, introduced in Section IV) to
where they exist within the IoT device lifecycle of Figure 2,
and outline which pre-sale stakeholders are in the best position
to implement them. These “outcome focused guidelines” [7]
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Fig. 4. Four-quadrant implementation difficulty vs. practice effectiveness grid.
Table IV gives examples for each quadrant.
are comprised of a wide variety of standards, guidelines,
and recommendations from various academic, industrial, and
government institutions, which were then aggregated to form
the guidelines. This mapping highlights again how a variety
of major pre-sale stakeholders are required to achieve these
outcomes. For each of the 13 guidelines, we reinterpret them
into new type-S outcomes that are more specific. We propose
a system (using Figure 4) for categorizing practices by their
difficulty of implementation and effectiveness in improving
security for a system, and map these reinterpreted outcomes
based on this system. This is done to identify which existing
outcomes are insufficient for improving IoT security posture
based on their implementation difficulty, or their lack of
effectiveness in improving security.
For pre-sale stakeholders looking to potentially implement
a best practice, the ideal practice would be both easy to
implement (i.e., does not require extreme amounts of time,
resources, or manpower) and highly effective (i.e., provides a
significant boost to security posture). Figure 4 gives a simple
2x2 grid of combinations for the difficulty of implementing
any given practice, and its security effectiveness. Any can-
didate currently falling into quadrant 4 is a prime candidate
for security research, in order to find a new (less difficult)
technical mechanism, ideally even moving into quadrant 2.
Table III includes each DCMS guideline, with a brief
listing of example industry documents that incorporates related
practices, and where they belong in our four-quadrant grid.
We have selected this set of guidelines to highlight their
relationship to the IoT lifecycle and how unclear the guidelines
are. The DCMS highlights four stakeholders and states that
these are “primarily responsible for implementation” [7]. Our
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TABLE III
ANALYSIS OF UK DCMS GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMER IOT SECURITY. TABLE INDICATES STAKEHOLDERS IN A POSITION TO IMPLEMENT EACH, AND
WHERE IN THE LIFECYCLE THEY ARE IMPLEMENTED. “X” DENOTES A TYPE-S OUTCOME, WHICH SUGGESTS AN ACTION (SECTION II-A DEFINES
“ACTION” AND “OUTCOME”). DM (DEVICE MANUFACTURER). HM (HW MANUFACTURER). OD (OS DEVELOPER). AD (APP DEVELOPER). PI
(PRODUCT INTEGRATOR). END-USERS DO NOT APPEAR IN THE STAKEHOLDER COLUMN AS THESE GUIDELINES ARE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR
PRE-SALE STAKEHOLDERS.
UK Guideline [7] Example
References
Implies
Action?
Responsible
Stakeholder
Lifecycle Stage
(from Fig. 2)
UK-1. “No default passwords” [28], [29], [30] X PI 1.3
UK-2. “Implement a vulnerability disclosure policy” [31], [32], [28] X DM 1.1, 3.1a
UK-3. “Keep software updated” [32], [33], [34] DM, OD, AD 1.1, 1.2b, 3.1b
UK-4. “Securely store credentials and security-sensitive data” [28], [35], [29] OD, HM, PI 1.2a, 1.2b, 1.3
UK-5. “Communicate securely” [32], [28], [35] OD, AD 1.2b, 1.3
UK-6. “Minimise exposed attack surfaces” [36], [37], [38] HM, OD, AD 1.2a, 1.2b, 1.3
UK-7. “Ensure software integrity” [28], [39], [40] OD, AD 1.2b
UK-8. “Ensure that personal data is protected” [36], [41], [42] OD, AD 1.2a, 1.2b, 1.3
UK-9. “Make systems resilient to outages” [32], [28], [33] DM, OD 1.1, 1.2b
UK-10. “Monitor system telemetry data” [28], [29], [38] DM, OD, AD 1.1, 1.2b, 3.1a
UK-11. “Make it easy for consumers to delete personal data” [43], [44], [45] DM, AD 1.1, 1.2b
UK-12. “Make installation and maintenance of devices easy” [31], [39], [43] DM, AD 1.1, 1.2a, 1.2b
UK-13. “Validate input data” [28], [43], [46] DM, OD, AD 1.2b
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Fig. 5. Mapping of DCMS guidelines to selected IoT device lifecycle events.
analysis incorporates a different (but similar and more specific)
set of stakeholders (discussed in Section V), as we feel they
more closely fit our model of the IoT lifecycle, particularly
with the pre-sale phases where we note a heavy representation
of practices (Section IV). As we note that each of these 13
guidelines are outcomes rather than practices, we classify
each of the DCMS’ 13 guidelines as either type-V or type-
S based on whether or not they imply an action (type-S
outcomes suggest actions—Section II-A). While some of the
13 are more intuitive about what to implement (e.g., UK-1),
a number of them are rather vague, requiring searching for
more depth; or unclear how the problems are solved from a
research perspective (e.g., UK-13’s secure software update).
This relates directly to the concept of outcome versus action,
as discussed previously in Section II-A.
Reinterpreting the previous outcomes, in Table IV we pro-
duce a matching 13 outcomes that suggest actions, or indicate
more clearly what steps need to be taken. We consider this
a mid-way point between an outcome (specifically a type-V
outcome) and an action. As these new outcomes ideally direct
the implementer towards actions, we place each into one of the
four quadrants from Figure 4 and discuss their placement here.
Placement of these outcomes are in some cases subjective,
but provide an understanding of how the grid relates back
to practices. The outcomes discussed in the following four
sections (quadrants 1 through 4) discuss these reinterpreted
outcomes in the order that they are found in Table IV.
Quadrant 1—Easy Implementation, High Effectiveness: Highly
Effective Government Regulation/Should Already Be Imple-
mented
Practices that are fairly easy to implement and having high
effectiveness make strong candidates for government regula-
tion, but should also be expected to already be implemented.
These are the practices that, technically-speaking, are not dif-
ficult to implement and have manageable overhead (e.g., low
maintenance, high usability, minimal extra services to run), but
provide significant improvements to the security of a device.
While it should be expected that any manufacturer looking to
provide a solid security posture for their products have already
implemented these, government regulation may be what is
needed to push other non-implementing manufacturers into
line.
S-1. If passwords are used, pre-configure with a per-device
unique password, rather than a default or no password.
This outcome seeks to prevent attackers from using a
broad scanning technique to try “default” (including empty)
passwords on wide classes of devices in the hopes that a user
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TABLE IV
UK GOVERNMENT GUIDELINES [6] REINTERPRETED TO MORE CLEARLY SUGGEST ACTIONS (I.E., CONVERTED
FROM TYPE-V OUTCOMES TO TYPE-S OUTCOMES). FIRST COLUMN MAPS GUIDELINES TO FIG. 4 QUADRANTS.
Quad. DCMS Guideline Reinterpreted as a Type-S Outcome
1 UK-1. “No default passwords” S-1. If passwords are used, pre-configure with a per-device unique password,
rather than a default or no password.
UK-4. “Securely store credentials and security-sensitive data” S-4. Ensure user credentials, keys, and other sensitive data is securely stored
within the device, through secure hardware storage or modern encryption
techniques.
UK-5. “Communicate securely” S-5. Maintain confidentiality, integrity, and authentication for communications
to/from devices and services.
UK-6. “Minimise exposed attack surfaces” S-6. Operate on the principle of least-privilege and disable unused functions
such that a device is only capable of running intended functionality.
UK-8. “Ensure that personal data is protected’ S-8. Use encryption, integrity, and reliable access control mechanisms to protect
or back up user data, and comply with data protection laws and regulations for
market regions.
2 UK-2. “Implement a vulnerability disclosure policy” S-2. Develop policies specifying actions to follow in the event of a vulnerability
being found in your product.
UK-12. “Make installation and maintenance of devices easy” S-12. Design devices (physical design and user interfaces) to be conveniently
usable for users to facilitate successful installation and maintenance.
3 UK-9. “Make systems resilient to outages” S-9. Form a design, implementation, and test plan for gracefully handling power
outages without resulting security exposures.
4 UK-3. “Keep software updated” S-3. Automate and secure the supply and installation of security updates for
software/firmware.
UK-7. “Ensure software integrity” S-7. Provide means to detect and possibly recover from potential software
integrity violations, and return to a known safe-state of the device.
UK-10. “Monitor system telemetry data” S-10. Monitor any telemetry or logging data produced by the device for
unexpected behavior.
UK-11. “Make it easy for consumers to delete personal data” S-11. Provide users with the ability to conveniently view and delete any
personal data stored by devices and/or related services.
UK-13. “Validate input data” S-13. Ensure safe handling and validation of any input data to prevent malicious
inputs, whether by any user, programmatic, or network interface.
has not configured their device, or configured it incorrectly.
This was the method of attack that the Mirai botnet [3]
used to gain access to so many devices. A unique password
can be long enough to make it infeasible for attackers to
attempt to guess, but short enough to reduce user difficulties
in entering a long password. NIST recommends as little as
6 digits for a randomly-chosen PIN for defending against
online attacks, assuming other preventative methods are in
place (e.g., rate-limiting, failed attempt lock-out) [47]. A prime
example of this is the requirement by the California (USA)
state government to have non-unique passwords on new IoT
devices [26]—the requirement is fairly easy to implement,
does not require much maintenance, is easy for the end-
users to manage, and adequately defends against default-
password-based attacks. Post-sale stakeholders—primarily the
end-users—are at risk of having their devices compromised if
they are using publicly-known default passwords. Enforcing
mandatory unique passwords may incur a small usability
penalty if the password is lengthy or complex, but once the
first-time configuration and mandatory password change has
taken place, the random default password would no longer be
used.
S-4. Ensure user credentials, keys, and other sensitive
data is securely stored within the device, through secure
hardware storage or modern encryption techniques.
A device must be able to protect the data that it is storing.
This may include user credentials such as passwords, PINs,
and login information; cryptographic keys used for estab-
lishing secure communication with services or other devices;
or sensitive user-provided/recorded data. In the event that a
device is remotely compromised (i.e., an attacker has gained
control of the device over a network connection), the attacker
must be prevented from accessing this data. In the case of
a physical breach where an attacker has physical access to a
device, the same applies. Should a device be compromised
(whether physically or remotely), an end-user’s sensitive data
may be leaked, or technical information may be disclosed,
allowing an attacker to maliciously use the device.
S-5. Maintain confidentiality, integrity, and authentication
for communications to/from devices and services.
Ensuring communications are secured (i.e., providing end-
to-end confidentiality, integrity, and entity authentication)
should be expected to be implemented by a manufacturer. Gov-
ernment regulation to enforce such a practice would be useful
to ensure manufacturers that are not following this practice.
While it may not be the case for many IoT devices, depending
on what is being manufactured and the application, some
resource constrained devices may struggle to perform certain
cryptographic operations useful in secure communications
[48]. Computation times for public-key operations on low-end
8- or 16-bit processors may be long, but more significantly,
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the power consumption on battery-powered devices needs to
be taken into account.
S-6. Operate on the principle of least-privilege and disable
unused function such that a device is only capable of
running intended functionality.
It should be an expectation that devices—particularly those
that are publicly-accessible or internet-facing—have all non-
essential functionality disabled. Assuming this is done ad-
equately, this prevents a device from being used for non-
intended purposes such as using non-required protocols (e.g.,
sending/receiving data via CURL, TELNET to other hosts) or
installing new software for additional functionality. This may
be difficult to do, however, as it requires complete knowledge
of a device and the software running on it. Using a pre-built OS
(e.g., some Linux distribution) may require a deeper analysis
to find all non-essential functionality and a way to disable it.
User accounts in an OS may be one way to short-cut this issue,
but any privilege escalation exploits an attacker may be able
to use then leaves remaining features free to be used. Wireless
sensor network (WSN) or IoT-specific OSs (e.g., RIOT [20],
Contiki [22]) may assist in this with their smaller footprint
and specific focus.
S-8. Use encryption, integrity, and reliable access control
mechanisms to protect or back up user data, and comply
with data protection laws and regulations for market re-
gions.
Personal user data must be protected from being exposed
to malicious attackers and non-authorized users. This not only
has to do with data stored on the device, but also data in transit
and stored on servers, meaning it shares many of the same
concerns and issues that B4 and B5 have. Where it differs is
that this is information sensitive to the individual users of a
product. Data in transit follows the same security requirements
as B5 (i.e., communications must maintain confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and must only be accessed by authenticated, authorized
parties), and stored data (either on a server, hub device, or the
generating device itself) must be able to secure data with the
same requirements as B4.
Quadrant 2—Easy Implementation, Low Effectiveness: Should
be Implemented, But Lower Priority
Practices that are easy to implement but have low effec-
tiveness in preventing vulnerabilities are candidates for what
some may consider “optional” practices. While best practices
for security should generally not be considered optional, we
recognize that, particularly from a business perspective, the
cost of implementing even an easy practice may still outweigh
the benefit, especially if any additional overhead is required
to maintain the practice.
S-2. Develop policies specifying actions to follow in the
event of a vulnerability being found in your product.
While malicious actors are unlikely to report vulnerabilities
in your products, other ethical entities may provide insight
into any problem areas that are found, and this should be
encouraged. Being notified of existing vulnerabilities makes
you both aware of problems and provides an incentive to work
to correct the errors, as they are now (as often is the case in
academia) publicly-known and potentially exploitable. Making
a contact form or address available on a public space (e.g.,
company website) for users and researchers to report issues
is a fairly low-difficulty action to implement, but itself does
not necessarily provide highly improved levels of security.
Responding and addressing the vulnerabilities is the critical
step to be taken.
S-12. Design devices (physical design and user interfaces)
to be conveniently usable for users to facilitate successful
installation and maintenance.
One of the key characteristics of IoT is their lack of “stan-
dard” user interfaces, i.e., devices commonly lack screens,
keyboards, mice, and touchscreens, instead often relying on
remote techniques to interface with devices for purposes
other than initial configuration or maintenance. These remote
techniques include connecting to a web server being run on the
device from an IoC device, or using a manufacturer-provided
smartphone/tablet (mobile) app that talks with the IoT device.
While this may be somewhat straight-forward given the expe-
rience industry and academic researchers have gained over the
years by working on mobile and web interfaces, installation
and maintenance may now extend to a significant number of
devices, each needing their own attention. If devices are not
easy to be installed and maintained, users may choose to forgo
configuration out of frustration and instead run (if possible)
with default configuration. While not directly related, this
issue highlights the importance of the “safe defaults” design
principle.
Quadrant 3—Hard Implementation, Low Effectiveness: Low
Return on Investment
Practices that are hard to implement and have low security
effectiveness are generally not seen as practices that provide
a great return on implementation investment. These practices
tend to have a higher level of maintenance (possibly requiring
some live service or system to be maintained), a lower
usability for the end-users or maintainers, and do not provide
significant security benefits to be worth the cost. This ties
heavily back into the cost-benefit analysis that an organization
would take when investigating practices and their worthiness
within IoT products.
S-9. Form a design, implementation, and test plan for grace-
fully handling power outages without resulting security
exposures.
The ability for a device to attempt to prevent service
outages is a useful feature, but given how interconnected
today’s devices are with other local devices or hosts on the
internet, resources may be best spent elsewhere. Further, with
downtime being quite infrequent in modern services, impact
to users—while potentially being critical in the moment for
some applications—is likely to not be too severe over a short
amount of time. This said, depending on the architecture some
devices within an environment may only need basic local
transmission to another, perhaps hub device. Ensuring a base
level of functionality may be impossible for some devices, but
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may be remedied by taking actions to reduce the impact when
service resumes. For example, if communications with a base
station are interrupted, a smart thermometer could maintain
readings as normal, but cache each reading until it can regain
connectivity with the base station, then forward the data along.
This is against the spirit of live and immediate feedback as is
common in IoT, but may allow for some functionality such as
historical readings to be maintained. Implementations should
take care to regain service gracefully, as having to send a
large back-log of data may overwhelm receiving devices and
potentially drain a significant amount of battery power.
Quadrant 4—Hard Implementation, High Effectiveness: Prime
Target for Research
Practices that are difficult to implement, but have high
effectiveness, are prime targets for researchers. A practice that
has high effectiveness should be a goal to have implemented.
It is the role of researchers to find new methods for more
easily implementing these currently difficult practices. Ideally,
practices in this category would, over time and due to the
efforts by researchers, move to the sweet-spot of Easy-High
where they could then be regulated (if need-be).
S-3. Automate and secure the supply and installation of
security updates for software/firmware.
While effective at eliminating vulnerabilities in devices after
being discovered, the implementation of automatic and secure
device updates is significantly challenging. If we make the
naı¨ve assumption that end-users will keep their devices’ soft-
ware updated, this may also be a practice implemented in the
Standard Usage phase; however, this is unrealistic. Automatic
updates provide pre-sale stakeholders with a mechanism for
ensuring that software vulnerabilities can be addressed. While
generally not an issue for the IoC, this is a challenge in the
IoT for a few reasons. For one, updates must be transmitted
securely to ensure the integrity of the update. Highly con-
strained devices may struggle with public-key cryptography
[48], making it more challenging to establish session keys
and verify signatures provided with update images. Second, an
update infrastructure must be maintained for the lifespan of a
product, or at least until a sunset date where a device will be
known to not receive any more updates (a separate challenge
for IoT). Devices must, in some trusted way, be able to contact
update providers for secure transmission. If a manufacturer
goes out of business (unlikely for large corporations) or a
software provider stops updating their software, reliant devices
will now remain un-patched, with any existing vulnerabilities
persisting for the life of the device.
S-7. Provide means to detect and possibly recover from
potential software integrity violations, and return to a
known safe-state of the device.
Devices need to be able to return to some state in which they
know is safe. In the case of malicious attacks, implementing
defenses to prevent this could be done in hardware [49] or by
building preventative features into software [50], but consume
additional resources wither in the form of slower, more costly
computations (particularly on IoT devices where power is a
significant resource); or inflating the sizes of binaries and
general overhead. In lieu of defenses, the challenge is to
know when an integrity violation has taken place. Being able
to compare current running processes or files with securely-
stored pre-known states may be an avenue, but may not work
in cases where pre-known safe states are unknown such as
software updates or dynamic content.
S-10. Monitor any telemetry or logging data produced by
the device for unexpected behavior.
It is unrealistic to expect end-users to monitor telemetry data
produced by their devices, so if information is generated that
may be used in preventing or handling attacks, the data must
be viewed by the manufacturer (or other party responsible) or
done automatically locally. In the former case, the device must
be able to report this data to some remote location, requiring
services to be kept online for this purpose, and have the ability
to securely transmit the data to/from the device. This itself
adds another potential attack vector that the manufacturer will
have to account for in their threat model.
Alternatively, intrusion detection systems (IDS) could be
employed to protect IoT devices, but this requires either a
network-based IDS or one running on each host. Given the
constrained nature of IoT devices, this is more challenging;
however, recent work has shed light on the potential for IoT-
focused IDSs [51] [52]. Efforts are ongoing.
S-11. Provide users with the ability to conveniently view and
delete any personal data stored by devices and/or related
services.
Ensuring the users can delete any personal data that may
have been stored becomes both a usability and technical
challenge. For usability, interfaces have to be designed that
first allow users to understand the magnitude of the data that
may be stored (and potentially where it is stored) and to allow
them to successfully delete the data. IoT devices typically do
not have screens, and those that do tend to not have screens of
significant size to allow users to evaluate their data. Interfaces
such as voice, small screen, or no interface at all make it
difficult to see what data is stored. This is often alleviated
by using other devices such as a computer or smartphone to
access a website or some other interface in order to review
and delete their data, but requires data to be stored in a cloud
service, a local hub device, or on a device providing a software
interface for external access.
S-13. Ensure safe handling and validation of any input
data to prevent malicious inputs, whether by any user,
programmatic, or network interface.
Input data into a process can come from a number of sources
including physical user input directly onto the device (e.g.,
buttons, touch screen, voice commands, etc.), application net-
work data, other pieces of software, or user-facing application
programming interfaces (APIs). While it may be somewhat
straight-forward to filter out the more obvious inputs such
as user text fields (e.g., cross-site scripting, SQL injection
attacks), ensuring all inputs from other, less obvious sources is
more of a challenge. A particularly notable example of this was
2014’s Heartbleed vulnerability, which exploited OpenSSL’s
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Heartbeat extension and allowed attackers to retrieve data in
memory from beyond the bounds of the message [53].
VIII. RELATED WORK
In this section we highlight related work that highly influ-
enced the topic, discussion, and/or direction of this work. As
previously noted, formal definitions for what a “best practice”
is tend to be lacking in the formal literature. A noted work
in this area by King [10] was discussed in Section II. Among
papers that define categories of practices or areas of challenges
for IoT security, Tschofenig and Baccelli [54] discuss efforts
by ENISA and the IETF to provide recommendations and
guidelines for improving IoT security posture. While not
defining categories for best practices, that work categorizes
technical and organizational areas to be considered for the
secure development and usage of IoT devices. Alrawi et al.
[2] analyze and systematize work in the field of home-based
IoT security and propose a methodology for how the security
of home-based systems can be evaluated. Throughout the work
they point to related work for reference, but fall short of
defining what a best practice is, mentioning that best practices
are “readily available”, but provide no specific references. RFC
8576 [12] proposes a generic model of the lifecycle of an IoT
device. Their model does not consider the stakeholders that
have a major impact at each phase; however, they acknowledge
that it is a simplified model, accurately representing major
phases that an IoT device passes through. Looking to how
manufacturers can be incentivized to provide a better security
posture, Morgner and Benenson [55] explore the relationship
between efforts in formal IoT technical standards (not to be
confused with a “standard practice”) and the (unfortunate)
reality of the economics of IoT security and its implications
for the general security posture of manufacturers.
In the informal literature (not peer-reviewed), despite the
lack of best practice definitions, countless documents offer
advice. As referenced throughout this work, according to
their publicly-provided dataset [56], the DCMS collected 69
documents from 49 different organizations [6]. Some of the
work more heavily represented in the collection includes se-
curity organizations such as the IoT Security Foundation [57],
the European Union Agency for Network and Information
Security (ENISA) [28], the Industrial Internet Consortium
(IIC) [39], and the GSMA [40]. Industrial security-focused
organizations comprise the most highly-referenced sources
in the collection; however, a number of government entities
(including the previously-mentioned ENISA) and businesses
are included. Examples include the US Senate [58], the US
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) [59], Microsoft [60], and AT&T [37]. This is not
meant to be an exhaustive list, but represents the breadth of
organizations seeking to contribute advice to the IoT security
space.
The DCMS targets their 13 guidelines at four stakeholders:
device manufacturers, IoT service providers, mobile appli-
cation developers, and retailers [7]. Our work focuses on
different, more specific stakeholders as they more closely map
to the major lifecycle phases presented in Section III.
IX. DISCUSSION & CONCLUDING REMARKS
The basic concept of best practices is widely known, and
understood by many non-experts even without prior study.
General understanding is an important foundation from which
to build a strong deeper level understanding, but at this point
even the research community lacks a firm basis from which
to make progress. Indeed as we have argued, in security and
technology communities (not to mention the general public),
ambiguity abounds regarding the language of technical best
practices. We suggest this begins from an absence of clear,
concrete, useful definitions surrounding best practices. Further
compounding this issue is the wide variety of terms used to
describe related concepts.
Our goal has been to improve upon this situation in a
systematic way, by exploring these issues first through generic
discussion and analytic classification, supported and cross-
checked through specific focus on consumer IoT devices and
their lifecycle. We followed this by further analysis of a
large collection of “security guidelines” compiled by the UK
government. We offer a more precise, consistent vocabulary
for the community to build on, to advance the identification
of security best practices, and for discussion within this subject
area—one of intense interest to governments and industry, and
of high consequential impact to the general public.
Using our discussion and analysis of a wide selection of
practices from industrial, academic, and government institu-
tions as a viewing lens, we uncovered conflation of the ideas
of security goals (outcomes), and the steps or methods by
which they may be reached (practices). We have also noted
an important characteristic for a recommendation or guidance:
whether or not it is actionable. Our working definition for “best
practice” insists that a practice necessarily be actionable.
Reviewing 1014 items of advice (a mix of guidelines,
recommendations, standards and practices) from industrial,
governmental, and academic sources (Section IV), we find
it alarming that 91% are not explicit practices that can be
followed, but desired outcomes. We believe that it is crucially
important that the organizations proposing and endorsing these
lists have a clear idea of whether they are recommending
practices, or specifying what might be called baseline security
requirements, or simply offering advice about good principles
to think about in the shower. If the goal is that relevant
stakeholders adopt and implement stated practices towards
the goal of reducing security exposures, then it would appear
imperative that (actionable) best practices be identified and
clearly stated, rather than vague outcomes—lest the target
stakeholders find that they are unable to map advice to a
concrete practice, even if they are motivated to do so.
We have also found that the majority (69.6%) of 1014 rec-
ommendations considered for consumer-focused IoT security
are those that would need to be implemented in the creation
(pre-sales) stage of the lifecycle of an IoT device, leaving
these in the hands of the product manufacturer and/or its
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hardware and software partners. End-users, upon purchasing
an IoT device, may positively impact security by following
appropriate best practices thereafter, but are not generally in
the position to address deficits created by the manufacturer.
This shines a light on the responsibility of pre-sale stakehold-
ers, including the overall nameplated manufacturer, to ensure a
strong security posture for items that only they are in a position
to control. Our analysis thus adds weight to the importance
of security motivation for manufacturers, on whom many of
these security practices are incumbent, but also the importance
of identifying, and clearly and unambiguously stating, (ac-
tionable) best practices. Unfortunately, our analysis suggests
that the organizations providing recommendations may well
be falling short of their own goals, if their belief is that their
recommendations are sufficiently detailed to be considered
actionable. The main point is: if security experts do not find
that guidelines are easily actionable, then it is unrealistic to
expect that (security non-expert) manufacturers will magically
find a way to adopt and implement the practices.
In order to identify, list and explain instances of best
practices, we first need to agree upon the granularity at which
these should be expressed, and indeed, agree on a useful
definition of “best practice”. Our work shows that this itself
appears to still be a work-in-progress. Once suitable best
practices are identified and captured, a next step is to take
measures that they be adopted and implemented—raising the
question of motivation for individual stakeholders to invest
in this exercise. As discussed (above and in Section IV),
the pre-sale stakeholders including manufacturer are essential
to success. A combination of the economic motivation of
manufacturers, their poor track record in IoT security to
date, and their apparent lack of accountability for security
vulnerabilities in general, point to a worrisome future, keeping
in mind also the lessons of markets for lemons [61]. It seems
quite apparent that self-regulation of the IoT industry been
largely unsuccessful; this falls against the backdrop of a grand
success of the overall software industry in disclaiming all
liability for software product flaws, despite itself falling far
short of delivering products without security vulnerabilities.
Whether government regulation of some form will arise, or be
necessary, is a separate question.
The problem of how to arrange that security best practices
are adopted and implemented, across a broad spectrum of
hardware-software systems, is not new. However, the Internet
as we know it has moved from an Internet of Computers
to an Internet of Things, with new consequences for the
physical world outside of computers themselves. IoT promises
convenience, productivity, and improved quality of life, but its
new links from the virtual world to our physical environment
and personal safety bring new threats, exacerbated by the
promised pervasiveness of IoT devices. To support security in
an IoT world, we believe a foundational piece is best practices,
beginning with a better understanding of what they are—both
generically, and specifically. One necessary component is a
proper, precise vocabulary that differentiates between desired
outcomes, and methods or practices that help achieve them.
Whether or not manufacturers have sufficient technical exper-
tise and knowledge, or are sufficiently motivated to commit
resources, to improve IoT security, the research community
can play an important role through first steps in providing the
language, and a foundational understanding, surrounding the
meaning, if not instances of, security best practices.
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